



CITES/GRASP Orang-utan Technical Mission Indonesia



8-12 May 2006

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Background

At its 13th meeting (Bangkok, 2004), the Conference of the Parties to CITES adopted Resolution Conf. 13.4 on Conservation of and trade in great apes. As part of the means identified in the Resolution to improve the conservation of great apes, the CITES Standing Committee is directed to "consider other measures such as technical missions, organized in cooperation with GRASP (Great Ape Survival Project) and other appropriate partnerships, followed by political missions if necessary". At its 53rd meeting (Geneva, June-July 2005), the Standing Committee instructed the Secretariat to liaise with the GRASP Secretariat with a view to conducting a technical mission to Southeast Asia regarding illicit trade in orang-utans. The CITES Secretariat subsequently contacted the CITES Management Authorities of Indonesia and Malaysia, as these countries are the orang-utan range States, and requested an invitation to conduct technical missions to both countries. Similar requests were made to Cambodia and Thailand, as these countries have been destinations for significant illegal trade in orang-utans. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand all indicated their willingness to receive technical missions. At the time of writing (May 2006), no response had been received from Cambodia.

Conduct of the mission

The mission to Indonesia was conducted from 8 to 15 May 2006. The mission team was composed of Ms Melanie Virtue, Team Leader, GRASP, UNEP and Mr John M. Sellar, Senior Officer, Anti-smuggling, Fraud and Organized Crime, CITES Secretariat.

This was the second occasion on which a CITES technical mission visited Indonesia. The first was in 1999, when the CITES Tiger Missions Technical Team visited the country (travelling to Jakarta and Way Kambas National Park in Sumatra). That team was led by Mr Sellar of the CITES Secretariat. Although the CITES Tiger Missions Technical Team considered illicit trade in other CITES Appendix-I species, the illicit trade in orang-utans was not noted to be a significant issue in 1999. The Tiger Missions Technical Team report can be viewed at: <http://www.cites.org/eng/com/SC/42/42-10-4.pdf>

Following a practice adopted for previous CITES technical enforcement-related missions, such as those conducted in relation to the illicit trade in caviar, ivory, the Tibetan antelope and the tiger, the CITES Secretariat wrote to the national CITES Management Authority of Indonesia identifying the aims of the mission, the type of activities the team would wish to undertake and the various organizations it would wish to consult. A draft programme was subsequently prepared and agreed with the mission team.

On its first day in the capital of Indonesia (Jakarta), the team met with and briefed the Minister of Forestry on the purposes of the mission. It then participated in a seminar, organized by the CITES Management Authority, to which almost 70 persons had been invited. Representatives of Customs, the Forest Department, the police, prosecution authorities, quarantine service, the wildlife trade association, media and non-governmental organizations were present. Presentations were made respectively by GRASP, the CITES Secretariat and the Forest Department on the aims of GRASP, illicit international trade in wildlife and national measures for the conservation of orang-utans.

Thereafter, the mission team travelled to Kalimantan and Sumatra, visiting orang-utan rescue and rehabilitation centres and meeting with government officials engaged in wildlife law enforcement and also NGOs that support such activities and general orang-utan conservation. The team also visited the airport and seaport of Medan in northern Sumatra. During the visit

to the airport, a seminar was held for CITES, Customs, Forest Department and Quarantine Service staff, where presentations on GRASP and CITES were provided by the team. NGO representatives also attended this seminar.

In common with previous practice, the present report does not identify in several instances the specific source of information gathered by the team. This approach of anonymity was used to encourage frank exchanges with the mission team, especially by junior ranks in government enforcement agencies. Wherever possible, however, the team sought corroboration from other sources for any opinions or information provided by individuals.

In this report, the team offers its conclusions and makes suggestions and recommendations to improve the status of orang-utans. These suggestions and recommendations are highlighted in bold.

Legislation

Indonesia acceded to the Convention on 28 December 1978 and it entered into force on 28 March 1979. It has notified the CITES Secretariat of one Management Authority, two Scientific Authorities and 16 Enforcement Authorities.

Orang-utans have been protected in the laws, ordinances or government regulations of Indonesia since 1925. They are one of 12 species that require, in addition to CITES provisions, the specific authority of the President of the Republic of Indonesia before any specimen may be exported from the country. Other examples of species that are allocated such special protection are the elephant, the Komodo dragon, rhinoceroses and the tiger.

Indonesia's national legislation for implementation of the Convention, the Regulations of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Number 8 Year 1999 on the Utilization of Wild Plants and Animal Species, has been assessed as part of the CITES National Legislation Project and has been classified as being in Category 1, i.e. it is adequate for the implementation of CITES. Persons engaging in trade contrary to these regulations are liable to a maximum fine of IDR 100 million and/or the suspension or cancellation of their trade permit.

Orang-utans are also protected under Article 21 of Act No. 5 Year 1990 concerning Conservation of Living Resources and Their Ecosystems. This makes such activities as the capture of, injury to, transporting, transferring or possession of orang-utans (whether live or dead) an offence. This is punishable by a maximum fine of IDR 100 million and imprisonment to a maximum of five years.

At the time of the mission IDR 100 million was approximately equivalent to USD 10,200.

In 2005, Presidential Instruction No. 5 was issued that requires government agencies with law enforcement responsibilities (a total of 18 altogether) to increase their efforts to combat illegal logging and also calls for increased effort to combat illegal trade in wildlife.

Indonesia signed the Kinshasa Declaration, adopted by delegates to the Intergovernmental Meeting and first GRASP Council meeting that was held in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in September 2005. Indonesia was elected at that meeting to be a member of the GRASP Executive Committee. Signatories to the Kinshasa Declaration, among other commitments, resolve to improve "the protection of individual great apes and their habitats everywhere by demonstrably improving where necessary the quality and the enforcement of relevant laws, as well as the capacity of law enforcement agencies". However, unlike CITES, the Kinshasa Declaration has no legal standing and signatories to the Declaration have no obligation to implement its provisions.

Orang-utan conservation issues

Orang-utan species

It is usually considered that there are two species of orang-utan¹:

- *Pongo abelii*, which is found in northern Sumatra, Indonesia. There are thought to perhaps be over 7,000 specimens of this animal remaining in the wild.
- *Pongo pygmaeus*, which has three sub-species:
 - *Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus*, which is found in northwest Kalimantan, Indonesia;
 - *Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii*, which is found in southwest Kalimantan; and
 - *Pongo pygmaeus morio*, which is found in eastern Kalimantan.

P. pygmaeus pygmaeus and *P. pygmaeus morio* are both thought to also occur in parts of Sabah and Serawak in neighbouring Malaysia. The three sub-species of *P. pygmaeus* are thought to perhaps total some 57,000 animals in the wild in Indonesia.

There seems, in Indonesia, to be relatively little mythology related to orang-utans, such as one sometimes finds associated with other CITES Appendix-I species such as elephants or tigers. The species does not seem to be particularly respected or valued (or indeed feared) by local communities. One researcher that the team spoke with was of the opinion that many local communities regard it as "just another monkey" and it is certainly true that primates are common and readily seen in many parts of the country. That said, it is closely associated with this part of the world and, until recently, the image of an orang-utan featured on one of Indonesia's banknotes.

Habitat

Indonesia is regarded as having substantial areas of orang-utan habitat but degradation and encroachment are viewed as major problems by officials and non-governmental organizations. Habitat loss is seen as increasing the number of orang-utan conflict cases and reducing the opportunity for population expansion. Many populations in the wild are fragmented and widely scattered. Field workers are concerned that the genetic viability may be impaired by the reducing size of the genetic pool and through the lack of links between isolated populations.

Suitable orang-utan habitat has been lost through timber extraction, both from illegal logging and legal concessions allocated by the government, but increasingly by forest areas being cleared for conversion to palm oil plantations.

Population studies

The figures quoted above were provided to the mission team by the Forest Department. These apparently come from studies undertaken both by the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The team was later told, however, that some sources of data (including NGOs) were believed to be over-estimating numbers to a significant extent. It seems, however, that there are several parts of orang-utan habitat in Indonesia where long-term research is being undertaken and some populations are relatively closely monitored. There are, therefore, parts of the country where population figures may be relatively accurate.

¹ According to some nomenclatural references there is only one species of orang-utan.

Conservation strategies

Indonesia has developed an orang-utan Conservation Strategy and copies have been made available to GRASP. The strategy addresses a range of issues, including habitat protection, research, community participation, *in-situ* and *ex-situ* conservation and enforcement.

The Forest Department has also identified five forestry priorities for the period 2005-2009. The first of these is to curb illegal logging and illegal timber trade but poaching or illegal trade in wildlife does not feature as one of the priorities.

Conflict

Overall, and particularly when compared against such species as elephants and the tiger, orang-utans offer little hazard or risk to residents of rural communities or their livestock. Similarly, historically, there seem to have been relatively limited problems relating to orang-utans 'raiding' agriculture or gardens. However, it is becoming increasingly frequent for conflict cases to occur as orang-utans' habitat reduces. As the size of forest cover reduces and the space for these animals disappears, they are more likely to stray into agricultural land and villagers' gardens in search of food.

Orang-utans will also enter palm oil plantations, especially recently-planted areas, where they seek out the 'fruits' in the middle of the young palm trees. This may lead to the destruction of the trees. In such cases, whereas villagers might view orang-utans as a nuisance or pest, palm oil plantation managers are likely to take a much more serious view. Whilst villagers or plantation managers may occasionally seek assistance from the Forest Department or relevant NGOs to 'rescue' and remove orang-utans, a more common response appears to be to engage in the illegal killing of such orang-utans, either by shooting or poisoning.

There is currently no government compensation scheme for damage caused by orang-utans. A number of methods have been deployed to scare 'problem animals' away from areas into which they have strayed. However, unlike perhaps elephants or tigers, orang-utans (because of their greater intelligence and learning abilities) are able to determine relatively quickly whether there is any real risk posed to them by some scare tactics and may subsequently ignore them.

There seems little reason to believe that conflict cases will do anything other than increase. The potential for the capture of problem animals by the authorities and their relocation to other areas seems extremely limited, particularly in Kalimantan where there is already a relatively high density of these animals in suitable habitat. Their capture and removal to 'rescue' or 'rehabilitation' centres is also very limited, since existing centres are already near to or exceeding their capacity to cope.

People living in or close to orang-utan habitat will understandably be frustrated by such conflict cases. Experience of this problem in other parts of the world, and with other species, shows that such frustrations invariably lead to people taking matters into their own hands. This will result in violations of the law regarding protected species, will often result in the inhumane killing of animals and, significantly and importantly, will often also result in such animals (or their parts and derivatives) entering into illegal trade. This aspect will be referred to in more detail later. Where the authorities' response to conflict cases is poor, slow or ineffective frustrations will grow and a species that might once have been respected or valued by local communities will increasingly be seen as nothing more than a pest or a source for illicit gain.

The team **believes** that a clear and well-publicized policy should be established by the Forest Department for responding to conflict cases. The Department could perhaps investigate whether there is any scope for the capture of animals and their transfer to zoos outside Indonesia. The team was advised that the international zoo community probably needs 'fresh' animals to improve genetic diversity. The import by other countries of orang-utans would, of course, require to comply with the provisions of Article III of the Convention, i.e. it could only be for a primarily non-commercial purpose. There is no reason, however, why their export could not be 'commercial', in the sense that such animals could be sold to zoological institutions, thereby recovering the costs of the authorities in capture etc. Any such export would also require presidential approval.

Some countries have used the above approach with regard to problem animal control in elephants. It cannot, however, offer the appropriate solution for every case and there will be only so many zoos that might wish to acquire orang-utans. Consequently, it seems unavoidable that the Department should also consider euthanasia. Whilst this may seem harsh, unpleasant and might not be popular (particularly as this may regularly necessitate the killing of a mother and its young), the team believes that the alternatives are rapidly running out.

It seems to make little sense to continue to add more and more orang-utans to rescue and rehabilitation centres, especially since in many cases the chances of rehabilitation are few. The prompt and humane killing of 'problem animals' (presumably by shooting) would also send a clear signal to local communities that the Forest Department is ready to support them and respond to their concerns. Euthanasia does, however, bring with it the risk that local communities may interpret this as meaning that orang-utans are present in such significant numbers that they can be killed without affecting their population viability. Having said that, the reality would seem to be that euthanasia, even if employed on a relatively 'regular' basis for problem animal control purposes, is very unlikely to threaten the survival of wild populations of orang-utans. After all, the shooting of problem animals is a response which is effectively employed by some tiger range States, which have considerably smaller numbers of specimens of that species compared with orang-utans.

Whilst not advocating euthanasia as a standard and routine approach to problem animal control for orang-utan conflict cases, the mission team **believes** that it should be seriously considered as one method of response.

Orang-utan poaching and illegal trade issues

Poaching

Aside from the conflict situations and the resulting motivation to kill orang-utans described above, it appears that the poaching of primates in general is not infrequent at all in parts of Indonesia. A significant proportion of this would seem to be of a subsistence hunting nature and that the animals are eaten by local communities. orang-utans appear to be equally at risk from this as any other primate species.

The team was told that, in some rural communities, some restaurants would prepare dishes containing orang-utan meat, but that such food would usually have to be specifically requested and would not be openly on offer. Despite this potential demand and possible outlets, the hunting of orang-utans for the 'bushmeat trade' does not appear to be common, as might be seen with some primates in Africa. The team is aware, however, of published research that states that dried orang-utan meat may sometimes be smuggled out of the

country for consumption in other parts of Asia. This would not be surprising, given the demand for primate meat elsewhere in the region.

Previously published research also refers to the use of orang-utan fat and skin being used as some form of talisman to protect houses against fire.

Interestingly, particularly compared with the poaching of other species (especially relatively large individual animals) elsewhere in the world, everyone the team spoke with said that few orang-utan carcasses are ever found in the forest or in conflict areas; although one researcher said she had seen two or three skeletons. This seems to corroborate the general opinion that many animals killed during poaching incidents will be eaten.

A by-product of poaching for meat and conflict killings, but also as an end in itself, is the illegal capture of live orang-utans. Juvenile orang-utans remain with their mothers for several years. Female orang-utans will usually only give birth once every 6-8 years and will normally be accompanied by their young during the interim periods. Consequently, many females poached for their meat or illegally killed because they are raiding gardens or are 'problem' animals in palm oil plantations will present the killers with a young orang-utan. Rather than being eaten, it seems such animals will usually be retained by the poachers or killers. What subsequently happens to these animals will be addressed in following sections.

Opinions with regard to the age at which a juvenile orang-utan can effectively be taken into possession as a 'pet' are divided. One highly-experienced researcher told the team that orang-utans older than 7-8 months have, by that age, acquired their teeth and will consequently bite, or try to bite, any human that seeks to handle them. This person was therefore of the view that poachers seeking to capture young orang-utans sought out animals below that age. Other persons that the team spoke with, both Forest Department staff and NGO personnel, disagreed. The mission team was of the opinion that it is highly unlikely that those engaged in either opportunistic or deliberate capture of live juveniles would take such an aspect into consideration, unless specifically instructed to do so by a 'customer'. In any case, despite any initial handling difficulties that might be encountered by the 'capturer' and 'customer', the team's experience of viewing orang-utans in 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres indicated that juvenile animals can potentially relatively quickly adapt to close contact with humans. Indeed, it seems that juvenile orang-utans, removed from their mothers, will often seek and welcome 'replacement' affection, bodily contact, etc.

Illegal domestic trade in live orang-utans

The practice of keeping pets appears widespread in many parts of Indonesia. Several of the major towns and cities have large wildlife markets, though often dominated by birds. Whilst pet owners will keep a variety of species, the keeping of primates, including orang-utans, seems to have been common historically. This is despite the fact that such possession has been unlawful for many decades. The team was told that an orang-utan could be purchased for perhaps as relatively little as USD 100, although prices vary considerably depending on the market and intended use. orang-utans traded in the 'internal' market for purchase by Indonesia residents may be much cheaper. orang-utans intended for smuggling abroad are likely to attract considerably higher prices, especially if purchased from dealers in major towns or cities. It is clear that the ability of the 'customer' to pay influences the price, with 'foreigners' likely to be charged considerably more than local citizens.

Juvenile orang-utans are undoubtedly relatively intelligent, attractive and playful and can be affectionate. On the other hand, sub-adults and adults (especially males) will be very powerful and can be extremely aggressive. Consequently, the team learned that orang-utans tend to be

kept for a few years and then either abandoned or killed. Having been killed, some may then be eaten by the owner or may be sold to other people for human consumption.

This limited time-span of the orang-utan as a pet will presumably lead to the requirement to replace one animal with another; creating a vicious circle of illegal activities.

The mission team was unable to determine how many juveniles will simply be retained as pets (or passed on to fellow rural residents) by those engaged in poaching or those who kill 'problem animals' and how many will subsequently enter into the illicit trade chain for more commercial purposes. It is also not clear how many poaching or illegal killing incidents are opportunistic or are conducted deliberately with financial gain as the main motivation.

Aside from the orang-utans that are kept as 'pets', there also seem to be significant numbers of animals that are possessed as status symbols. Not only does such possession indicate social status or wealth on the part of the 'owner' but the mission team was often told that possession is sometimes for the purpose of demonstrating that the 'owner' was above the law and 'untouchable'. For example, it seems that possession of orang-utans in Sumatra is often by senior military and police officers or by local politicians. The team was advised that junior military and police staff, on encountering orang-utans held illegally by residents of rural communities, may confiscate such animals only to then deliver them to superior officers to curry favour. One researcher advised the team that it is estimated that 60 % of confiscated or 'rescued' orang-utans come from such sources. Just why this seems more prevalent in Sumatra is unclear, although the team heard that this might result from increased military and police presence in the area following the tsunami.

The team noted examples of other species in 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres that had been in the possession of senior political figures that appeared to have become bored with the animals and wished to get rid of them or had been persuaded to 'surrender' them.

The team also heard of some bizarre instances related to the possession of orang-utans. One of these was an incident concerning a village in central Kalimantan, which is apparently populated mainly by prostitutes and seems to be almost a brothel-village. An NGO discovered that a female orang-utan was being held in captivity in this village and was being treated almost as a prostitute. The animal was regularly shaved of its hair and men paid to have sex with the orang-utan. Since orang-utans have relatively small genitals, compared with humans, this animal was subjected to anal penetration on a repeated basis.

When the NGO and the Forest Department went to the village to confiscate the animal, the villagers refused them entry, to the point of confronting Forest Department staff and threatening them with machetes and other weapons. Eventually, and some time later, the authorities returned with a large contingent of heavily-armed Military Police, at which point the animal was seized.

The mission team was told, to its utter astonishment, that not a single person has been prosecuted in relation to:

- the illegal possession of a protected species;
- the commercial use of a protected species;
- the horrendous abuse of a protected species and associated animal welfare issues;
- the obstruction of law enforcement agencies in the execution of their duties; or
- the threats of violence towards law enforcement personnel.

The team learned that the animal in question has since recovered and is enjoying a 'normal' existence in a rehabilitation centre. Although it initially continued to behave and adopt

postures that were clearly linked to the manner in which it had been abused, such behaviour has now ceased. It was with satisfaction, but some surprise, that the animal was also found to be free of the HIV-AIDS virus.

The team also heard of an allegation that orang-utans were, at the time of their mission to Indonesia, being used at premises in Jakarta where they have been trained to engage in 'Thai-boxing'.

Illegal international trade in live orang-utans

There are several examples of orang-utans, many thought to be of Indonesian origin, being discovered in countries elsewhere in the world; where their legal possession and import in compliance with CITES is highly questionable. Among these are recent cases involving Cambodia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand. Indeed, Malaysia has recently repatriated 6 orang-utans to Sumatra and Thailand is likely to repatriate 53 others soon, which will probably go to Kalimantan. Saudi Arabia is currently (May 2005) communicating with Indonesia regarding the repatriation of a confiscated animal. It is rumoured that orang-utans have been smuggled to Viet Nam but no corroboration of this has been found and no seizures have been made.

Many of these animals have been discovered in 'Safari World'-type facilities, having often been trained to engage in public entertainment performances ranging from horse-riding to Thai-boxing. Frustratingly, although probably not deliberately, several such illicit imports appear to have been conducted at a time when countries of destination did not have in place adequate legislation to implement the Convention and, thus, the ability of the authorities in countries of destination to respond effectively following the discovery of such cases has been restricted.

The team was told by one Indonesia-based NGO of research it had conducted that indicated that some 40 orang-utans had been illegally exported in recent years, it was thought to Europe, by a national of the Netherlands who was based in Jakarta. Having achieved the support of the police, an attempt to export orang-utans illegally through the international airport at Jakarta was intercepted and prevented. In this case, the animals were concealed in carry-on hand baggage. The Dutch person was subsequently sentenced to five months' imprisonment. It is alleged that a person who acted as an informant in this matter was subsequently murdered.

SPORC personnel, NGO representatives and a representative of traders in CITES-species told the mission team that many illegally-harvested orang-utans, destined for illicit international trade, are removed from forest areas on the boats that ply the rivers carrying timber that has been legally and illegally extracted. Orang-utans are sold to the crews of these vessels and the animals are then conveyed either direct to other countries or to major ports in Indonesia where they will be transferred to other vessels operated by foreign crews and owners. Where orang-utans are in the possession of persons living in coastal areas of Indonesia, they may be sold to the crews of 'foreign' fishing vessels, such as boats from Thailand.

It appears that such trade routes are used by those individuals who engage in illicit trade in an opportunistic manner, as well as those who may deliberately seek out orang-utans as part of an illicit business or commercial enterprise. Intelligence related to the illegal import of one large shipment of orang-utans to Cambodia included information that a Thai fishing vessel had been involved, which is corroborated by non-Indonesian sources.

Opportunistic versus organized poaching an illegal trade

It was of particular interest for the mission team to try and determine how much illicit trade (whether domestic or international) is of an opportunistic nature, compared against trade that may be organized or 'ordered'. This was extremely difficult to determine.

The increase in palm oil plantations and general reduction of orang-utan habitat must undoubtedly be making life easier for poachers and will also provide more deaths and by-product live captures that create opportunities for local residents to benefit financially. However, this situation must inevitably also favour those who deliberately direct criminal activities towards orang-utans.

This is a complex subject and it seems likely that there will be cases where poachers and illegal killers will take possession of a juvenile orang-utan, initially content to retain it as a 'pet' only to subsequently sell it, having been sought out by traders or having encountered an opportunity to sell the animal. It is, therefore, very difficult to determine what poaching occurs 'to order'. The team did note, however, that none of the people it encountered suggested that persons were being specifically paid or equipped to hunt and poach orang-utans; something that is not at all uncommon elsewhere in the world with regard to other CITES Appendix-I species.

It must be recognized, however, that some of the detections of illegal possession, trade and import that have been made outside Indonesia concern significant numbers of orang-utans. This, in itself, indicates something of an organized structure to the harvesting, collection, trading and smuggling that would be required to meet such demand.

However, this is an aspect to criminal activities related to orang-utans that has not received sufficient research. The team is not aware of relevant law enforcement agencies in Asia having examined this issue, particularly by interviewing persons arrested or suspected of engaging in such activities or by employing other intelligence-gathering techniques. This is a serious deficiency in the current law enforcement responses to illicit trade in orang-utans. For example, although agencies in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have had repeated and in-depth communication and consultations with regard to the repatriation of confiscated orang-utans, the subject of trying to identify those responsible does not seem to have been discussed at all.

Levels of illegal trade

The varied and complex issues related to illegal trade are identified in the sections above. Whatever form the trade takes and whatever motivates it, the overwhelming evidence of the scale and seriousness of the problem is the number of orang-utans in 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres. In Kalimantan alone, this is approaching 1,000 animals.

It is hard to think of another CITES Appendix-I species, in any other country, where individuals are so regularly being confiscated or taken into the care. Indeed, it is hard to view this figure as anything other than an indictment against the law enforcement efforts of the relevant agencies in Indonesia.

Since the majority of orang-utans in 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres are juveniles, the overall number of poached animals can presumably be almost doubled if one attempts to estimate the scale of illegal activities, since a lot of these animals will have been taken from their mothers (who will have been killed during a poaching or 'problem animal' incident). As the seizures of orang-utans that have occurred in other parts of Asia have commonly involved many animals, one can reasonably predict that the numbers being smuggled from Indonesia

are also significant. It is further worthy of recognition that illegal trade in wildlife often involves high levels of mortality, which is especially true in the case of juvenile animals.

The figure that would consequently result from even a rough estimation of orang-utans affected by criminal activities speaks of a serious failure to protect and conserve this species. The numbers indicate:

1. that illegal activities directed at orang-utans must be at levels which current population numbers cannot sustain;
2. that significant numbers of the public, especially those living in or close to orang-utan habitat, do not regard this species as threatened or endangered and, thus, do not respect or value the animal;
3. that current efforts to protect orang-utans and prevent poaching and illegal trade are not effective; and
4. that there is currently no effective policy or practice in place to deter criminal activities directed at orang-utans.

Enforcement issues

Law enforcement resources

There are several government agencies that have the responsibility or authority to enforce Indonesia's wildlife-related laws, including Customs, the Forest Department, the police, the military police and the Quarantine Service. However, the agency with primary responsibility for such work is the Directorate of Biodiversity Conservation, Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, Ministry of Forestry (generally referred to in this report as the Forest Department, since that seems to be how most people refer to it in Indonesia).

The Forest Department has an Animal Protection Unit, within which are separate units spread throughout Indonesia:

- Tiger Protection Unit (4 locations);
- Rhino Protection Unit (4 locations);
- Orang-utan Protection Unit (2 locations);
- SPORC (Ranger Quick Respond Unit – 10 provinces);
- Wildlife Crime Unit (2 locations); and
- Elephant Patrol Unit (5 locations).

As their names suggest, some of these units have the task to undertake anti-poaching work related to specific species. The SPORC units have a more general law-enforcement role where, as the name suggests, they can be deployed to trouble-spots to reinforce other local Forest Department staff to deal with incidents. They also undertake patrol duties within protected areas and elsewhere to deter and detect illegal logging, poaching and illegal trade. Some SPORC staff will also be deployed to guard posts situated at the entrances and exits to protected areas and on the rivers that flow through many forest areas. Staff in SPORC units have received more intensive training and are better equipped than the basic field staff of the Forest Department. It appears that it will be SPORC units that often become involved in the confiscation of animals (including parts and derivatives) or timber that is possessed or being traded illegally.

Although the mission team was not able to meet staff of a Wildlife Crime Unit, it was advised that these have been established to assist in the prosecution of violations by liaising with other agencies and prosecution authorities.

Indonesia is a member of ICPO-Interpol and the World Customs Organization. It is a member of the recently-formed ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN).

Practical law enforcement

In common with many countries in the developing world or countries with economies in transition, wildlife law enforcement in Indonesia is primarily based upon anti-poaching work, general patrolling of relevant forest and other habitat areas and the use of static posts to check persons entering or leaving protected areas or travelling along road and water routes in or nearby such areas. Much of the patrol work is dictated by staff's local knowledge of the area and their experience of local wildlife crime. There seems to be little, if any, intelligence-led patrol work using crime-analysis data.

Although SPORC units and other Forest Department staff will respond to information received from local people, NGOs and other sources, there does not seem to be any active intelligence-gathering policy or strategy. Forest Department staff have no access to any reward scheme to either recruit or pay informants. The mission team was unable to learn of any particular covert work being undertaken by the Forest Department. In common with personnel in similar countries, Indonesia's Forest Department enforcement staff seem to focus on 'field' operations but do not specifically target places where illegal trade might be taking place, such as in major towns or cities, by seeking out intelligence or conducting covert operations to uncover criminal activities.

Forest Department staff are located at the major export ports of Indonesia, to ensure compliance with national law and CITES. For example, shipments of specimens of CITES-listed species will be checked by Forest Department staff prior to export to ensure the presence of valid CITES documents and to ensure that the specimens match what is authorized by the documents. The shipment will subsequently be examined by the Quarantine Service before final clearance by Customs. Export control procedures will be further discussed later in this report.

As in many other parts of the world, wildlife law enforcement staff in Indonesia are relatively low down the law enforcement hierarchy. In practical terms, this results in reduced training, equipment, authority, salary and respect in comparison with their counterparts in agencies such as Customs or police. In turn, this means that criminals are less likely to be deterred by or 'scared of' such personnel and may also be more inclined to try to bribe or corrupt such staff; no doubt successfully on occasions. Importantly, it also means that Forest Department staff are less likely to readily obtain the cooperation of and support from counterpart law enforcement agencies.

The judicial process

As was noted by the CITES Tiger Missions Technical Team in 1999, Forest Department staff have no direct access to prosecution authorities or the judiciary. Anyone arrested by the Department must be taken to the local police and it is the police that will review the available evidence, gather additional evidence (such as taking witnesses' statements) and prepare a report for the prosecution. It is also the police who will take into custody persons accused of offences.

The mission team repeatedly heard from a variety of sources (government officials and NGOs) that this 'middleman' role of the police regularly appears to form a barrier or hurdle to effective law enforcement. This takes a variety of forms:

- A. the police may regard wildlife law offences (including possession of an orang-utan) as being a minor matter that is not worthy of their attention and will decline to pursue the case;
- B. in cases where the offender is a poor person from a rural community, the police may decide that he or she has been unaware of the significance of their 'crime', has been motivated by poverty, has no ability to pay any penalty, and is not worthy of prosecution. The police will decline to pursue the case;
- C. the police will review the evidence and determine that it is not sufficient to enable a prosecution to take place. Whilst this will inevitably be justified on occasions (especially since not all Forest Department staff may be fully aware of evidence-gathering requirements and standards of evidence, etc.), it seems this explanation is also used where point A above is the true reason for their lack of cooperation;
- D. the police will request additional information or evidence in such a bureaucratic manner that the burden becomes oppressive on the Forest Department staff and they will be discouraged from insisting that the police prepare a prosecution report (point A above applies);
- E. the police will respond that they have no capacity to house the prisoner or no officers to undertake work on the case (point A above applies);
- F. the police will agree to pursue the case but only if the Forest Department pays certain 'fees' or 'costs'. This seems to be a murky area. The mission team was unable to determine whether the Forest Department actually is responsible for reimbursing or financing work by the police. For example, the police will undoubtedly incur costs associated with preparing a prosecution report. These will include the feeding and housing of any prisoners, the gathering of evidence etc. It appears, on occasions, that in some provinces the Forest Department does, openly, contribute to such costs. However, importantly, the team was told that there are many times when such 'fees' and 'costs' will never appear in any official records, no receipts will be given, and that such payments are essentially corrupt incentives to encourage police officers to simply do their job. It also appears that the police will sometimes indicate that 'costs' are required for several months of work and keeping accused persons in custody. The team could get no explanation for why the preparation of a report would take so long and this seems another device to either corruptly extract more money or discourage the Forest Department from pursuing a case. It appears that NGOs may also occasionally receive requests to help cover 'fees' and 'costs'; and
- G. the police will initially agree to accept the case but will subsequently advise the Forest Department that the accused has been, or is about to be, released and the case has been, or is about to be, dropped. At this stage points B, C, D, E or F may be quoted. Alternatively, no explanation is given or 'demand' made and the Forest Department later discovers that the family or friends of the accused have secured his release, either by bribing the police into dropping the case or by bringing pressure to bear via contacts with senior police or other government officials. It seems, on occasions, that the police will take a case on the expectation that opportunities will result for them to acquire payments and that there was little intention to ever assist the Forest Department to obtain a prosecution.

In fairness to the police, the mission team found in conversations with several Forest Department officers that they personally had considerable sympathy with point B and it appears that there will be many instances where local Forest Department staff may not actively encourage the prosecution of offenders. Additionally, it seems perfectly reasonable to speculate that Forest Department staff will be as open to corrupt influences not to pursue

cases as the police may be. Comments made to the team reinforce and confirm such speculation.

Likewise, the team also heard (as the Tiger Missions Technical Team did in 1999) that prosecution authorities and the judiciary may also be open to corrupt practices that will result in a case not being pursued or the evidence (despite its standard) being ruled to be inadequate.

It is interesting to note that Indonesia is placed 137th, alongside Afghanistan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia and Uzbekistan, in Transparency International's Global Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, where the lowest ranking, i.e. most corrupt, has a placing of 158.

Setting aside any hurdles that may exist in bringing offenders to justice, the mission team was unable to learn of any significant prosecution or action taken against persons engaged in criminal activities involving orang-utans, other than the case of the national from the Netherlands who was organizing 'commercial' smuggling of animals via Jakarta.

The team was also struck by the experience during its time in Sumatra when the head of the provincial SPORC hurriedly left their company during a meal one evening, having been summoned to the local police headquarters where four persons had been arrested for attempting to sell two elephant ivory tusks. Whilst the team had previously been told that the recently-appointed Police Commander of the province appeared to be more inclined to assist in wildlife law enforcement, especially illegal logging matters, it was nonetheless noticeable that this police response to illicit trade in ivory seemed to be in direct (although very welcome) contrast to what the team had been told could be expected in relation to orang-utan matters.

Customs controls

In many CITES Parties, if not most, the role of the national Customs authority is an integral and essential part in effective implementation and enforcement of the Convention. Indeed, it will probably be Customs officers that detect, intercept and seize wildlife contraband more than any other law enforcement agency. Such seizures occur because Customs officers or teams are specifically targeting shipments of specimens of CITES-listed species, as part of risk-assessment and profiling activities. But they also occur as part of Customs' general border control and import/export work. The team discovered that this is unlikely to be the case with regard to the national Customs authority of Indonesia.

The Customs authority of Indonesia apparently undertakes no routine or random inspections of goods leaving the country. Their primary focus is seemingly on the inspection of documents related to export clearance procedures. If the documents are in order, Customs have no general authority to open and inspect, for example, containers about to be loaded onto aircraft or sea-going vessels.

In order to conduct a physical inspection of goods, Customs must have 'intelligence' that a package or container has contraband inside. If they do possess such intelligence, officers must obtain written authorization from their Director General (in Jakarta) before opening a container. If such authorization is sought and granted, an inspection will usually be delayed until the exporter of the goods is present. It was not clear to the team whether any delay to await the presence of the exporter is required by law or whether this was just a policy issue.

The team visited the major seaport of Belawan, near Medan in northern Sumatra, where many sea-going vessels of a wide variety of size and carrying a similarly wide variety of cargoes leave Indonesia. It was told that authority to conduct intelligence-driven inspections is

probably sought two to three times each year. It was also told that 'intelligence' could take a number of forms, such as reasonable suspicion prompted by inconsistencies observed during the screening of cargo using X-ray machines. However, no such screening capability exists at the seaport. X-ray machines are available at Medan International Airport and the team saw one being used to screen domestic cargo. It was told that cargo for export was subjected to similar screening. However, Customs staff at the airport appear to conduct no more intelligence-led, specifically-authorized inspections or searches than their colleagues at the nearby seaport.

In the case of CITES shipments formally declared for export, these restrictions on Customs' ability to search and inspect may have little consequence; especially since the specimens should be checked by Forest Department and Quarantine Section staff before reaching the final Customs clearance stage. However, where it does have an impact is: in any case where information may be received that an unlawful export is about to take place; where goods have 'cleared' export controls but have yet to physically leave the country; and where non-specific intelligence is received that might require the inspection of a variety of goods or the searching of a number of containers. If the Forest Department was the recipient of such information or intelligence, it would have to rely on Customs to conduct inspections and searches.

Whilst the mission team was not provided with examples of the nature of 'intelligence' that would justify the request for, and grant of, authorization to conduct an inspection or search, the fact that such authorizations are provided on only two to three occasions each year for a major seaport such as Belawan clearly indicates that very high standards of information and justification are expected. It seems reasonable to predict, therefore, that requests from the Forest Department for Customs to conduct searches are unlikely to receive a high level of support or response.

This restriction upon Customs' powers of inspection and search apparently dates from a regulation introduced in 1995. Whilst officers that the team consulted were unable to explain the reasoning behind this policy, the team suspects (from experience elsewhere in the world) that this may have been introduced as an anti-corruption measure. This is because it is unfortunately not unknown, as acknowledged by the World Customs Organization, for Customs officers to abuse their powers in relation to search, inspection and import/export clearance processes to seek bribes to facilitate such clearances or to not undertake inspections and searches. Whilst the team can understand why such a policy may have been introduced, it is nonetheless cognisant of the fact that such a policy may also make the smuggling of contraband much easier. If persons engaged in illicit exports know (as they surely must do) that containers are very unlikely to be opened and inspected as long as the required export documents are in order, this facilitates their criminal activities. Since such persons will similarly realize that they ought to avoid declaring containers as having wildlife specimens inside, there will be no prompt for the Forest Department or Quarantine Service to inspect the contents either.

The mission team **believes** that this policy is open to significant and serious exploitation by those engaged in wildlife crime (and presumably those engaged in a wide variety of other criminal activities too) and **suggests** it be reviewed by the Customs authority of Indonesia.

Orang-utans in 'captivity'

'Rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres

The mission team, in preparing its report, has deliberately used inverted commas in relation to 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres. This is because such words do not necessarily accurately describe what is taking place in the several centres spread throughout Indonesia.

This is not to say that such centres do not undertake important work. Indeed, the team quickly appreciated that the Forest Department simply could not cope without the presence of such centres, both in logistical and financial terms. Most centres are operated by NGOs, which do so using funds provided by donors (the general public, foundations, government sources, etc.). Several centres also undertake very important research activities, with regard to the studying of both wild and 'captive' orang-utans. However, their role in the conservation of orang-utans and their support to law enforcement agencies, especially the Forest Department, may be worthy of review.

As was noted previously in this report, there are very large numbers of orang-utans in 'captivity' in Indonesia. The mission team visited one facility in central Kalimantan that houses over 400 orang-utans. This facility expects to soon receive the 53 animals that will be repatriated from Thailand and to provide long-term care for them.

This facility, and others in Kalimantan, has a very restricted potential to rehabilitate orang-utans. Whilst the staff in such centres routinely undertake work to prepare animals in their care for release into a 'wild' environment, the reality is that there are currently no areas in Kalimantan into which they can be released. Not only is suitable habitat difficult to identify but current Forest Department policy dictates that animals cannot be released into areas where wild populations of orang-utans are already present. There is, apparently, one area in Kalimantan that might be suitable, both with regard to the habitat and also the absence of wild orang-utans. However, its suitability has yet to be assessed and the process to do so seems to be taking a long time.

The potential for orang-utans from centres in Kalimantan to mix with wild populations must be considered carefully, especially since there is a risk that animals of one of the sub-species might be released into habitat where it does not naturally occur. The team was advised that DNA profiling of orang-utans in Kalimantan centres, to distinguish between sub-species, is not currently widespread. On the other hand, the centre(s) in Sumatra have been particularly careful to only accept specimens of *Pongo abelii*. On the other hand, the centre(s) in Sumatra have been particularly careful to accept specimens of *Pongo abelii* only. Whilst this may be simpler owing to there being no sub-species of *P. abelii*, care needs to be taken nonetheless since it is not always possible to distinguish animals of this species from those of *P. pygmaeus* morphologically and DNA profiling ensures that no mistakes are made.

Compared against centres in Kalimantan, orang-utans taken into captivity in Sumatra have routinely been apparently successfully returned to the wild. For example, over 100 animals have been released into suitable habitat in Sumatra in the past three years, whilst few reintroductions have occurred in Kalimantan. Although the lack of suitable release habitat is the main factor with regard to Kalimantan, it also seems that the Sumatra centre(s) adopt different rehabilitation techniques.

The team noted that there are several NGOs (some locally-based but primarily international) operating in Indonesia that conduct orang-utan research and/or rescue and rehabilitation work. Not surprisingly, each NGO may have its own attitudes and policies regarding orang-

utan conservation, rehabilitation etc. Sometimes these are in dramatic conflict with each other and the team noted that there is considerable criticism by one NGO of another. This lack of cooperation and collaboration between NGOs must be counter-productive. It also does not help their interaction with the Forest Department and the team formed the impression that there are 'battles' to achieve close links and endorsement of activities from the Department. Given what seems to be, on occasions and in some places, a culture of corruption there is also the potential for NGOs to 'buy' the favours of the Forest Department or for Forest Department officials to seek payments before its staff collaborates with a particular NGO.

Whilst not true in all cases, the team noted that some NGOs seem to be almost fixated with the acquisition of orang-utans that have been 'rescued' or 'confiscated', and give less attention to preventing the removal of orang-utans from the wild, which should surely be the most important priority. Some NGOs seem to almost ignore the fact that the potential for reintroduction to the wild of confiscated and rescued orang-utans is very limited for many animals. Such NGOs may consequently be concentrating their efforts (and associated fund raising) on rescue and rehabilitation whilst devoting less effort to discouraging poaching and the illicit acquisition of and trade in orang-utans.

The remote likelihood that even a small percentage of the almost 1,000 orang-utans presently in 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres in Kalimantan can ever be released into the wild cannot be ignored. The team believes that the harsh reality of the present situation, and the genuine risk that it will get worse, needs to be addressed by some NGOs.

The government and confiscated and rescued orang-utans

There must be very few government authorities in the world that have provided, or could readily provide, budgetary provision for the housing and care of specimens of large CITES Appendix-I species, even on a temporary basis and in relation to small numbers of specimens. The team sees no reason to think that Indonesia is in any better a position to respond to seizures of orang-utans. Indeed, the team was told by several officials that Indonesia could never cope with its current situation if NGO-funded 'rescue' and 'rehabilitation' centres were not in place.

That being recognized, it seems strange that Indonesia is actively seeking the repatriation of orang-utans seized in Cambodia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand. Whilst there are undoubtedly political considerations being taken into account, especially with regard to high-profile campaigns by some NGOs, the team notes that the Government of Indonesia is unlikely to bear much of the costs associated with such repatriations. In particular, the responsibility of long-term care for these animals, and the associated costs, are likely to fall on the NGO community. It seems reasonable to predict that the only orang-utans that may be rehabilitated to the wild will be those of the *Pongo abelii* species that were returned to Indonesia from Malaysia. It is likely that few others will ever experience life outside a rescue centre.

Whilst the mission team would certainly wish to see those who have illegally imported orang-utans receive appropriate penalties and the animals in question be removed from their possession to appropriate long-term housing, it is far from convinced that repatriation to the country or area of origin (especially if that is Kalimantan) is appropriate and meaningful. Not only does this potentially involve costs (especially with regard to long-term care) that might be better allocated elsewhere, such as conservation or anti-poaching work, but it also brings into question whether a country deserves to have returned to it specimens of CITES-listed species that it has failed to prevent from illegal export in the first place.

The mission team is firmly of the opinion that some of the discussions and campaigns that have taken place in recent months have involved considerable misunderstandings of not only the provisions of CITES but have also failed to take sufficient account of the realities of the status of orang-utan populations (captive and wild) in countries of origin and the likelihood of repatriated animals ever enjoying a life outside captivity.

The team hopes that instances involving the seizure of large numbers of orang-utans (or other CITES-listed species) will not have to occur in the future. However, if they do, the team **believes** that a much more objective and realistic approach needs to be taken to determining the appropriate disposal of confiscated live animals.

General observations by the mission team

The team was unable to reach any conclusion other than that the protection of orang-utans in Indonesia is significantly inadequate. The team believes that the situation is so serious that the CITES Secretariat would be justified in invoking the relevant processes under Article XIII of the Convention. Whilst the information obtained by the mission team may not be sufficient to demonstrate that there are serious shortcomings with regard to implementation of the Convention by Indonesia (although its export controls seem highly questionable), it appears obvious that orang-utans are being adversely affected by trade (both domestic and international illicit trade).

However, in reaching this conclusion the team was unable to determine exactly why this should be the case. The CITES Tiger Missions Technical Team identified, in 1999, various areas for improvement with regard to Indonesia. But having done so, the Team also recognized that Indonesia seemed to be committed to trying its best to protect its wild populations of tiger. The CITES/GRASP orang-utan Technical Mission Team found no evidence of such commitment. Instead, there seems to be complacency at many levels with regard to criminal activities directed at orang-utans. In reaching this conclusion the team, for a variety of reasons, does not find the Forest Department to be particularly at fault. Indeed, the enthusiasm, dedication and commitment of individuals that the team encountered is often commendable but these persons seem to be trying to undertake their duties in an environment where the protection of orang-utans does not appear to receive any priority or to be taken seriously by the government, law enforcement agencies or the public.

Recommendations

The CITES/GRASP Orang-Utan Technical Missions Team reviewed the comments made by the CITES Tiger Missions Technical Team in 1999 with regard to aspects for improvement in relation to Indonesia. To a significant extent these appear to remain applicable in relation to what the orang-utan Mission Team found in 2006. Consequently, the comments are reproduced *verbatim* below:

Aspects for improvement

Indonesia appears to have suffered a relatively lengthy period of political difficulties, together with civil unrest in some areas. International media reports also suggest significant corruption at very senior levels of government and that this has led to the over-exploitation of some natural resources. Understandably, such a climate is not conducive to high levels of motivation among government officials and enforcement personnel. The severe financial problems facing the country have also resulted in relatively poor levels of pay, equipment for enforcement and project funding.

That said, the team encountered many dedicated individuals and saw excellent examples of specialized work. There is clearly a base upon which initiatives can be built and expanded.

*In particular, the team **recommends** that the concept of the specialist Tiger and Rhino Units should be widely expanded to encompass other areas of the country. It believes, however, that the reliance upon NGO support, management and leadership of these schemes is open to being interpreted as an abdication of governmental responsibility and that this should be addressed.*

*The team **recommends** that the government work towards raising the status and increasing the authority of DFNC enforcement staff. Specialist units should not only target illegal activities in the field but their role should be expanded further into intelligence gathering and the combating of illicit trade. The team believes that there is scope for such units, with the provision of suitable training and powers, to deal direct with prosecution authorities, thereby removing the potentially unnecessary involvement of the Police. Alternatively, the routine involvement of police officers in working alongside specialist DFNC staff in combating wildlife crime could be utilized.*

*There appears to be sufficient grounds to suspect that significant illicit trade in Indonesia's fauna and flora, to domestic and international markets, is taking place. Enforcement authorities should evaluate this trade, it is **suggested** covertly initially, and then take clear and effective action against it. The open nature of the trade noted by the technical team suggests that few deterrent factors are operating at present.*

*Combined with the above recommended enforcement, the team **suggests** that fresh education and awareness campaigns, targeted at the general public, enforcement authorities and the judiciary, should be conducted.*

Indonesia is a major CITES trading State. In common, however, with many other Asian countries, its rural populations may well not benefit from, and thus not value, surrounding fauna and flora in a lawful manner. Eco-tourism might be one way of providing benefits.

The CITES/GRASP orang-utan Technical Mission Team is conscious that there are a range of recommendations that it could make with regard to combating illicit trade in orang-utans. However, it is firmly of the opinion that the most important requirement is for Indonesia to send a clear message to those involved in offences relating to orang-utans that this will not be tolerated.

The team **believes** that it ought to be relatively easy to convey that message by ensuring that people found in possession of orang-utans are promptly prosecuted and that adequate penalties are imposed. This may involve having to make an example of some residents in rural areas but the team believes there is no other option. If this is not done, the present situation will continue where there is no effective deterrent to those who may, opportunistically or deliberately, poach or possess orang-utans.

The team also **believes** that a message should be conveyed, from the highest levels of government, to politicians, the military and the police that the possession of orang-utans by officials in these areas of public service will not be tolerated. It **suggests** that, in the case of the military and police, consideration might be given to initially issuing a warning that such possession will immediately result in demotion or dismissal as an alternative to prosecution. Here too, the team **believes** that word of such a stance would soon spread throughout the

ranks and, if this policy (or one of prosecution) is strictly enforced, the current sense of apparent inviolability that is present among the military and police would quickly be dispelled.

In establishing such a new approach, the team **believes** it would be appropriate, and probably necessary, for discussions to take place at the highest level of government and that the Minister of Forestry should meet with his counterparts in Customs, the military and the police to determine how best to dispel the current complacency. Indeed, if thought appropriate by the Government, a presidential instruction might be one way of addressing this issue.

The team recommends that the CITES Management Authority of Indonesia report to the CITES Secretariat on the steps taken to address the current situation and that the Secretariat thereafter report on this subject at the 54th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee (Geneva, 2-6 October 2006).

Acknowledgements

The CITES/GRASP orang-utan Technical Mission Team wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the Government of Indonesia for the assistance and support provided to it during its work, especially by the staff of the CITES Management Authority. It also records its appreciation of the assistance and frank exchanges of information provided by a range of Forest Department, Customs and Quarantine Service personnel and the staff of non-governmental organizations.

The team also wishes to thank the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which provided funding to the CITES Secretariat to enable orang-utan technical missions to take place.

Distribution of the report

The team recommends that its report be allocated a restricted circulation status initially. This is primarily because it is aware that comments in the report, which describe what might be regarded as deficiencies in law enforcement regarding orang-utans, could be exploited by unscrupulous individuals or criminals. It seems inappropriate, therefore, for the document to be made public at this time. Apart from the Government of Indonesia, it suggests that copies of the report be made available to the Chairman of the CITES Standing Committee, the Chairman of the GRASP Executive Committee and the CITES Secretariat's contact points in ICPO-Interpol and the World Customs Organization.



Some of the over four hundred orang-utans in a rehabilitation centre in Kalimantan